Abstract: |
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are particularly prone to security attacks. However, it is well-known that perfect security is not achievable. Therefore, it is important to identify threats and evaluate their severity, for prioritizing the security countermeasures to be adopted, even since design time. In this work, we propose an approach that binds formal methods and network simulation for assessing the effects of security attacks on WSN applications from design time, starting from the abstract model of the system. Formal methods make it possible to build abstract system models and state properties of general validity, but cannot provide any concrete measurement regarding the network and the application. On the other hand, network simulators can provide precise and realistic information about simulated scenarios only. As a proof of concept, we design and prototype an application-level communication protocol, which is simulated both on attack free and attack scenarios. First, the protocol’s formal properties are specified and proved via UPPAAL. Then, the resulting UPPAAL model is used to automatically generate a network model for the WSN simulator Castalia. Finally, the network model is simulated against attack free and attack scenarios, for gathering realistic information about the protocol behavior and performance. |