

#### New directions for high-throughput and high-security communication


Adrian Perrig, Network Security Group, ETH Zurich



#### **The Internet is on Fire!**

- Lack of sovereignty
- Frequent outages
  - https://downdetector.com
- Constant DDoS attacks
  - https://www.digitalattackmap.com
- Frequent routing attacks
  - https://bgpstream.com
- Lack of communication guarantees
- Expensive maintenance

SCION





vent ype	Country	ASN	Start time (UTC)	End time (UTC)	More info
'ossible lijack		Expected Origin AS: ZOHO-EU, NL (AS 205111) Detected Origin AS: LNLT-3549, US (AS 3549)	2020-10-06 01:01:28		More detail
'ossible lijack		Expected Origin AS: ZOHO-EU, NL (AS 205111) Detected Origin AS: LNLT-3549, US (AS 3549)	2020-10-06 01:01:28		More detail
Outage		SWIFTNETBROADBAND-AS SWIFTNET BROADBAND PRIVATE LIMITED, IN (AS 133713)	2020-10-05 22:18:00	2020-10-05 22:22:00	More detail
Outage		U-LAN-AS, RU (AS 48128)	2020-10-05 21:24:00		More detail
Outage		TPODLASIE, PL (AS 39375)	2020-10-05	2020-10-05	More detail

## **Inspirations for a New Beginning**

- Many exciting next-generation Internet projects over the past 25 years
- General Future Internet Architectures (FIA)
  - XIA: enhance flexibility to accommodate future needs
  - MobilityFirst: empower rapid mobility
  - Nebula (ICING, SERVAL): support cloud computing
  - NIMROD: improved scale and flexibility
  - NewArch (FARA, NIRA XCP)
  - RINA: clean API abstractions simplify architecture
- Content-centric FIAs: NDN, CCNx, PSIRP, SAIL / NETINF
- Routing security: BGPSEC, S-BGP, soBGP, psBGP, SPV, PGBGP, H-NPBR
- Path control: MIRO, Deflection, Path splicing, Pathlet, I3
- Inter-domain routing proposals: ChoiceNet, HLP, HAIR, RBF, AIP, POMO ANA, ...
- Intra-domain / datacenter protocols: SDN, HALO, ...

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#### Why attempt redesigning Internet Architecture?

- We started our expedition asking the question: How secure can a global Internet be?
  - Answer: global communication guarantees can be achieved as long as a path of benign domain exists
- During our journey we discovered that path-aware networking and multi-path communication are powerful concepts that can provide higher efficiency than a single-path Internet
- Enables path optimization depending on application needs
- Simultaneous use of several paths unlocks additional bandwidth Explore new networking concepts without the constraints imposed by current infrastructure!



#### **Discoveries on our Journey**

- During our journey, we have encountered many interesting discoveries
- Several discoveries suggest new approaches for inter-domain networking

The real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes, but in having new eyes. Marcel Proust





#### **SCION Ambition: A Global Next-Generation Public Internet**



### **SCION Architecture Principles**

- Stateless packet forwarding (no inconsistent forwarding state)
- "Instant convergence" routing
- Path-aware networking
- Multi-path communication
- High security through design and formal verification
- Sovereignty and transparency for trust roots





#### **Insight: Formal Security Verification Necessary**

- To achieve strong assurance for a large-scale distributed system, formal security verification is necessary
- Performing formal verification from the beginning avoids "difficult-to-verify" components
  - Many design aspects of SCION facilitate formal verification
- Collaboration with David Basin's and Peter Müller's teams in the VerifiedSCION project








#### Approach for Scalability: Isolation Domain (ISD)

- Isolation Domain (ISD): grouping of Autonomous Systems (AS)
- ISD core: ASes that manage the ISD and provide global connectivity
- Core AS: AS that is part of ISD core





#### **SCION Overview in One Slide**

#### Path-based Network Architecture


#### **Control Plane - Routing**

Constructs and Disseminates
 Path Segments

#### **Data Plane - Packet forwarding**


- Combine Path Segments to Path
- \* Packets contain Path
- Routers forward packets based on Path
  - Simple routers, stateless operation

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### How to Deploy SCION: ISP


- CORE Routers are set up at the borders of an ISP
  - to peer with other SCIONenabled networks
  - to collect customer accesses
- No change to the internal network infrastructure of an ISP needed!



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#### How to Deploy SCION: End Domain

- SCION IP Gateway (SIG) enables seamless integration of SCION capabilities in enddomain networks
- No upgrades of end hosts or applications needed







#### **Insight: Incremental Deployment Possible**


- Incremental deployment of a new Internet architecture is possible, operating side-by-side with BGP
- For ISPs, new architecture can be deployed with minimal effort
- For end domains, SCION-IP Gateway (SIG) offers immediate benefits without updating any end hosts
- Important: no reliance on BGP for inter-domain operation ("BGP-free")
  - Overlay / insecure underlay should be avoided not to inherit vulnerabilities
- Re-use of intra-domain network architecture for local communication





#### **SCIONLab**

- Global SCION research testbed: <u>https://www.scionlab.org</u>
- Collaboration with David Hausheer's team at University of Magdeburg
- Open to everyone: create and connect your own AS within minutes
- ISPs: Swisscom, SWITCH, KDDI, GEANT, DFN
- Deployed 35+ permanent ASes worldwide, 600+ user ASes
  - Contact us to become an infrastructure AS, we can provide HW
- Kwon et al., "SCIONLab: A Next-Generation Internet Testbed", ICNP 2020





#### **Exciting SCIONLab Research Opportunities**

- Next-generation Internet architecture research
- Users obtain real ASes with all cryptographic credentials to participate in the control plane
- ASes can use their own computing resources and attach at several points in the SCIONLab network
- Path-aware networking testbed
- Hidden paths for secure IoT operation
- Control-plane PKI in place, each AS has certificate
- Network availability and performance measurement (bandwidth and latency)
- Supported features (PKI, DDoS defense mechanisms, path selection support, end host / application support)
- Inter-domain routing scalability research
- Multi-path research
- Multi-path QUIC socket
- End-to-end PKI system that application developers can rely on to build highly secure TLS applications
- Colibri inter-domain resource allocation system
- DDoS defense research using in-network defense mechanisms
- Next-generation routing architecture policy definitions

### **SCION Production Network**

• Led by Anapaya Systems

- BGP-free global communication
  - Fault independent from BGP protocol
- Deployment with international ISPs



- Goal: First **global public secure** communication network
- Construction of SCION network backbone at select locations to bootstrap adoption
- Current deployment
  - ISPs: Swisscom, Sunrise, SWITCH, Axpo, LG, + others joining soon
  - IXPs: SwissIX offers SCION peering, + others joining soon
  - Bank deployment: 4 major Swiss banks, some in production use

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### **Global Availability of Native SCION Connectivity**

- Native SCION (BGP-free) connectivity: no reliance / dependency on BGP communication
- SCION deploying ISP's networks are reaching global data centers and IXPs, offering native SCION connectivity
- Anapaya Connect: native SCION connectivity to 100+ data centers in 10+ countries








#### **Online Resources**

- <u>https://www.scion-architecture.net</u>
  - Book, papers, videos, tutorials
- https://www.scionlab.org
  - SCIONLab testbed infrastructure
- <u>https://www.anapaya.net</u>
  - SCION commercialization
- <u>https://github.com/scionproto/scion</u>
  - Source code



# **SCION Summary**

- SCION: Next-generation Internet you can use today!
- High-performance
  - Path-aware network enables application-specific optimizations to provide enhanced efficiency
  - Multi-path communication enables simultaneous use of multiple paths, increasing available bandwidth
- Secure, high assurance, high availability
  - Per-packet authentication verification possible on routers
  - Formal verification of protocols and code
  - Immune against routing attacks, e.g., BGP prefix hijacking

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### **Interesting Encounters on our Expedition**

- Security
  - Global communication guarantees are possible
  - High-speed crypto enables line-rate processing
- Networking
  - Multi-path routing is a necessity, not a luxury
  - Global QoS is viable





#### **Global Communication Guarantees in the Presence of Adversaries**

- Goal: If (routing policy compliant) path of benign ASes exists (with operational infrastructure), a sender can find, use, and achieve minimum bandwidth guarantees on that path
- Challenges
  - Network routing instabilities, misconfigurations, etc.
  - DoS attacks at various levels (control plane, data plane, end host)

#### **Observation: Stable Forwarding + Multi-path Necessary**

- Single-path forwarding cannot achieve strong availability guarantees
  - During routing protocol convergence, no path may be available
  - Equipment failure on path will result in unavailability until routing protocol updates and forwarding tables are adjusted
  - If forwarding path experiences high packet loss, then path is not usable for practical applications
- Approaches
  - Stable forwarding: packet-carried forwarding state protects forwarding from routing instabilities
  - Multi-path ensures presence of several paths, so as long as a single path works, end-to-end connectivity is assured

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#### **Bottleneck Routing Disrupts Availability**

- Routing protocol switches route traversing a link with limited capacity ( = bottleneck link)
- Bottleneck link traversal results in high packet loss
- Applications cannot operate and lose connectivity



- Since connectivity exists, often manual intervention needed to switch back to alternate path, outage typically persists for 30+ minutes
- Frequent reason for outage, caused by misconfiguration or attack

Comment

#### Cloudflare DNS goes down, taking a large piece of the internet with it

Devin Coldewev @techcrunch / 11:50 pm CEST • July 17, 2020



For two hours, a large chunk of European mobile traffic was rerouted through China

It was China Telecom, again. The same ISP accused last year of "hijacking the vital internet backbone of western countries."

By Catalin Cimpanu for Zero Day | June 7, 2019 -- 19:41 GMT (20:41 BST) | Topic: Security



#### **Announcement of Failed Routes**

- In some cases, networks continue to announce routes that failed
- Example: August 30 CenturyLink/Level(3) Outage <u>https://blog.cloudflare.com/analysis-of-todays-</u> <u>centurylink-level-3-outage</u>

"CenturyLink/Level(3)'s network was not honoring route withdrawals and continued to advertise routes to networks like Cloudflare's even after they'd been withdrawn"

#### **Insight: Secure Routing Insufficient**

 Secure routing protocol cannot prevent outages caused by bottleneck link or continuing announcement of failed or congested routes, as announcement is often legitimate







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


# Availability in a public Internet is threatened by different types of DoS attacks

Link-flooding	Attacker floods network links with excessive amount of traffic			
attacks	Can target access links (last mile) or core links in the network			
	Often executed using botnets and/or amplification techniques			
End-system	Attacker exhausts computational or memory resources of victim			
attacks	Often possible due to other defense mechanisms such as firewalls			
	Examples: state exhaustion, signature flooding			
Control-plane	Attacker disrupts important control-plane mechanisms or access to services			
attacks	Services are essential for a functioning network			
	Examples in SCION: beacon server, path server, certificate server			



# SCION is an Internet architecture with both strong security properties and high availability



### **High-Speed Packet Processing**

- Current high-speed Internet links: 400Gbit/s (Gbps)
- Arrival rate for 64-byte packets: one packet every 1.3 ns
- High-speed asymmetric signature implementation: Ed25519 SUPERCOP REF10: ~ 100µs per signature
- AES-NI instruction only requires 30 cycles: ~ 10ns
- Memory lookup from DRAM requires ~ 200 cycles: ~ 70ns
- Symmetric crypto enables high-speed processing through parallel processing and pipelining

# **DRKey & Control-Plane PKI**

- SCION offers a global framework for authentication and key establishment for secure network operations
- Control-pane PKI
  - Sovereign operation thanks to ISD concept
  - Every AS has a public-key certificate, enabling AS authentication
- DRKey
  - High-speed key establishment (within ~20 ns), enabling powerful DDoS defense mechanisms
- PISKES: Pragmatic Internet-Scale Key-Establishment System, Rothenberger et al., ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS) 2020

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## **Dynamically Recreatable Key (DRKey)**

- Idea: use a per-AS secret value to derive keys with an efficient Pseudo-Random Function (PRF)
- Example: AS X creates a key for AS Y using secret value SV<sub>X</sub>
  - K<sub>X→Y</sub> = PRF<sub>SVx</sub> ( "Y" )
  - Intel AES-NI instructions enable PRF computation within 30 cycles, or 70 cycles for CMAC
    Key computation is ~7 times faster than DRAM key lookup!
  - Any entity in AS X knowing secret value SV<sub>X</sub> can derive K<sub>X→\*</sub>



### **EPIC: Every Packet Is Checked**

- Goals
  - Per-packet source authentication by every router and destination
  - Per-packet-unique hop fields
  - Path validation by destination
- Assumption: global time synchronization ( $\pm 100$ ms)
- Attacks prevented
  - Malicious router replays packets or increases packet size
  - Hop field MAC is brute forced and destination attacked until expiration time
- EPIC: Every Packet Is Checked in the Data Plane of a Path-Aware Internet, Legner et al., USENIX Security Symposium 2020

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#### Insight: Cryptographic Processing at Line Rate Possible

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- Symmetric-key cryptographic operations are possible within nanoseconds, thus enabling linerate processing
- With hardware implementation, computing an AES block cipher can be accomplished within a few nanoseconds
- DRKey + EPIC systems enable per-packet source authentication in software ~ 100 ns
- This enables new approaches for network security



#### Importance of Path Awareness & Multi-path

- Generally, two paths exist between Europe and Southeast Asia
  - High latency, high bandwidth: Western route through US, ~450ms RTT
  - Low latency, low bandwidth: Eastern route through Suez canal, ~250ms RTT
- BGP is a "money routing protocol", traffic follows cheapest path, typically highest bandwidth path
- Depending on application, either path is preferred
- With SCION, both paths can be offered!







#### Insight: Multi-Path is a Necessity for High Availability and Performance

- Inter-domain multi-path is not a luxury, but a necessity to achieve high availability
- Rapid failover without routing system convergence
  - Routing bottlenecks can be avoided
- Enable higher network capacity
  - No more passive links for redundancy, all links can be active
  - Simultaneous use of several links
- Enables higher communication efficiency
  - Latency- vs. bandwidth optimal paths can be chosen
- Helps defend against DoS attacks, as adversary needs to congest all links
- QoS needs multi-path, as several alternatives need to be available to attempt resource reservations






### **Volumetric DDoS Attacks**

- Attacker overloads network link to induce congestion
- Defense requires sophisticated approaches
  - EPIC dynamic hop field computation
  - COLIBRI global resource allocation and reservation



#### Coremelt Attack [Studer, Perrig, Esorics 2009]


- Adversary controls many bots distributed across the Internet
- Bots send traffic between each other, thus all traffic is desired by destination
  - Traffic is not sent to victim as in regular DDoS attacks
- Adversary can exhaust bandwidth on victim link
- Result: attack traffic exhausts bandwidth in per-flow fair sharing systems





#### Crossfire Attack [Kang, Lee, Gligor, IEEE S&P 2013]

- Adversary controls distributed bot army
- Observation: due to route optimization, few links are actually used to connect a target region to rest of Internet
- Adversary can contact selected servers to overload target links
- Result: disconnect target region from remainder of Internet



### **COLIBRI: Scalable Global QoS**

- Thanks to several innovations, global QoS is now scalable and practical
- Stable paths ensure reservations are not affected by routing changes
- Multi-path enables searching for paths with sufficient bandwidth
- No per-flow state on routers, enabling scalability
  - DRKey enables high-speed per-packet source authentication
  - Efficient probabilistic large flow detection enable overuse detection
  - Per-flow stateful control-plane implemented on server infrastructure

SCION

 Per-neighbor fairness enables simple admission decision and configurations for ISPs

#### **Admission Algorithm with Per-Neighbor Fairness**

- Each AS defines neighbor-to-neighbor minimum bandwidth guarantees
- For any path, AS-to-AS minimum bandwidth guarantee can be computed, regardless of other demands
- Algorithm guarantees that no set of ASes can reserve a disproportionate amount of bandwidth through any link



#### **Insight: Bandwidth Reservation Offers Many Advantages**

**SCION** 

- Explicit bandwidth admission simplifies transport layer
  - No need for sophisticated congestion control: simply use constant bitrate (CBR)
  - Reduce amount of acknowledgments due to very low loss rate
  - Fairness can be enforced at level of admissions
  - Possible reduction in energy utilization at end points
- Reserved but unused bandwidth can be used for best-effort traffic: no wasted bandwidth
- Fine-grained traffic engineering possible for ISPs
- Majority of traffic today is video: well suited for CBR traffic
  - Could simplify buffering and adaptive-bitrate algorithms



#### **Expeditions Enable New Insights & Discoveries**

- What started with the question "How secure can a global Internet be" has rewarded us with an exciting journey of insights and discoveries
- We hope to question engrained assumptions to counter Internet ossification
- Join the journey
  - https://www.scionlab.org
  - https://www.scion-architecture.net



#### **SCION Team**

